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I've always had a conflicted feeling about the CRV coin. Saying that no one uses Curve anymore isn't quite right. It still manages over a billion dollars in funds and generated about $2.06 million in fees in the last 30 days. Among a bunch of old coins left with only communities and roadmaps, this counts as a solid business. But to say CRV is severely undervalued, I don't dare to conclude that quickly. CRV is currently around $0.26, up about 27% in a week. Many people see that it used to be over ten dollars and think it's ridiculously cheap now. But a low coin price doesn't equal a low valuation. CRV currently has a circulating supply of about 1.547 billion, a total supply of about 2.409 billion, and a theoretical max supply of 3.03 billion. Comparing today's CRV price directly with historical prices under early supply conditions isn't very meaningful. I think the real problem with CRV has never been whether Curve has business. It's whether the money Curve earns can sustainably translate into CRV's value. Simply holding CRV doesn't automatically grant protocol revenue. You need to lock CRV into veCRV to gain governance rights and corresponding fees; the maximum lock period can be up to four years. The advantage of this design is that those willing to lock long-term are more tightly aligned with the protocol's interests. The downside is obvious: the mechanism is too complex, making it hard for ordinary people to have a "buy and hold" experience. Plus, CRV emissions have always existed; while the protocol generates income, it also needs to incentivize liquidity with tokens, which easily leads to a situation where the business is good but the coin price disappoints. So now when I look at CRV, I'm not too concerned about when it will return to $1. I'm more focused on three things: Whether Curve's real income can continue to grow; Whether crvUSD can become a stable source of business; Whether the growth rate of protocol income can gradually surpass token incentives and supply pressure. Also, security risks can't be ignored. In March 2026, the sDOLA/crvUSD LlamaLend market still experienced an oracle manipulation event, causing about 822,500 crvUSD borrower equity losses. My view is simple: Curve is not a dead protocol, and CRV is not a bargain you can understand at a glance. It has products, users, and income. But it also has emissions, lock-up thresholds, complex governance, and security risks. If in the future Curve can rely less on "issuing tokens for liquidity" and more on trading fees, lending, and crvUSD to sustain itself, CRV might truly see a value reappraisal. Until then, I'm willing to pay attention. But I won't automatically think that the current 26 cents is a golden opportunity just because it was over ten dollars before. The biggest fear for old projects isn't that no one remembers them. It's that everyone remembers how glorious they once were but no one seriously calculates how much they actually earn today. $CRV #Curve #DeFi #Ethereum #CryptoMarket

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A few days ago, I said Elon Musk was going to sell the Tesla Shanghai factory, and the comment section said it was all debunked. That's because you don't understand Musk; his denials are even more genuine than confirmations 😂 In-depth analysis: Why Tesla Shanghai won't be sold, and why Musk can't achieve a closed loop from chips to satellites, from ground to space? On August 6, SpaceX and Tesla jointly announced the construction of a super chip factory. One of these companies has US defense contracts, and the other is a giant with 45% of global production based in Shanghai. A military aerospace company that completely excludes Chinese factors is going to deeply bind with an automaker that owns the largest single factory in China. The security reviews between the two countries can delay or kill the project. There are also three actions that are more sincere than words: First, restricting Chinese employees' access to global data. According to multiple media reports, Tesla may be separating the office systems of China and the US businesses, restricting Chinese employees from directly accessing business data and systems in other regions. Second, initiating supply chain relocation; SpaceX is completely excluding Chinese factors from its global supply chain. Third, Tesla invested $2 billion to purchase SpaceX shares. In March this year, Tesla spent $2 billion to buy SpaceX shares. Although the stake is less than 1%, the significance of this transaction lies not in the shareholding ratio but in the upgrade from business cooperation to capital connection between the two companies. So these two companies are not only deeply cooperating in business but may even merge in the future. Musk's response to the merger question was that it is not suitable to discuss on a conference call and must follow proper procedures. This is not a denial; it is not a denial. The Shanghai factory is too important, which is why it is even more dangerous. In the first half of 2026, the Shanghai factory will deliver nearly 468,000 vehicles, accounting for more than 54% of global production. Such an important asset, how could Tesla possibly give it up? But on the other hand, precisely because the Shanghai factory is so important and deeply connected to the Chinese supply chain, it becomes more sensitive in the context of Tesla and SpaceX integration. The larger the Shanghai factory, the higher the future cost of separation, and the "institutional distance" that must be maintained between it and sensitive businesses like SpaceX must also be greater. Musk's chip empire blueprint is clear and grand: use Terafab to achieve high-end chip self-supply, use SpaceX's military orders and Starlink network to build space AI infrastructure, and use Tesla's autonomous driving and robots to consume computing power. This is a closed loop from chips to satellites, from ground to space. But this closed loop has one premise: it must pass US national security review.

Most people say that staking 42 million ETH is a supply positive, but I don't see it that way. The staked amount has surpassed 42 million, accounting for nearly 35% of the total supply. Many accounts say: ETH is becoming increasingly scarce, supply is locked, and price pressure is reduced. I understand this logic; on the surface, it does hold true. But if you look closely at what has happened with Ethereum this year, you'll find that behind the surge in staking rate is a more complex, even somewhat ironic story. On August 4th, Justin Drake, along with five other Ethereum Foundation researchers, submitted EIP-8361. The core mechanism is "Tapered Issuance Burn": as the staking ratio rises, the proportion of validator rewards that are burned also increases, until the staked amount reaches 50% of the total supply (about 60.25 million ETH), at which point new consensus layer issuance drops to zero. This proposal made me think for a long time. On the surface, EIP-8361 addresses the problem of "over-staking leading to centralization"—indeed, when 35% of ETH is locked in staking contracts, and Lido alone accounts for over 30% of validator share, the centralization risk is real. But here’s the question: who is most disadvantaged by this proposal? The ones most disadvantaged are those currently staking. If you stake ETH today, you earn about 3.5%-4% annualized yield. Once EIP-8361 passes and staking rates continue to climb, your rewards will be automatically diluted by the system until they reach zero at the 50% threshold. In other words, the more people stake, the faster they push the critical point where their own rewards diminish. It’s a bit like the story of everyone desperately pouring water into a pool, unaware that the pool has an ever-growing leak. Now, regarding the DeFi side. Ethereum staking’s base yield has long been regarded as the "risk-free rate anchor" in the DeFi world—interest rate pricing for lending protocols like Aave and Compound is, to some extent, referenced to this anchor. If EIP-8361 pushes this base yield down or even to zero, liquid staking projects that rely on Ethereum staking yields as their product narrative (Lido, Rocket Pool) and LRT protocols (EigenLayer’s EIGEN staking logic) will face valuation shocks. Community controversy over EIP-8361 is still significant. On the Ethereum Magicians forum, some voices directly say: the proposal was submitted just before the Hegotá upgrade deadline, leaving seriously insufficient time for community discussion. This is not an ordinary parameter adjustment; it is a fundamental change to Ethereum’s monetary policy, yet it was pushed through like an emergency bill. This procedural issue alone deserves separate caution. My current judgment is: the probability of EIP-8361 being implemented in 2026 is low, but its very existence already casts a question mark over ETH’s "monetary expectations"—what exactly will Ethereum’s future issuance policy be? Who decides? This uncertainty creates friction for institutions allocating ETH. This is my understanding at this stage, but I leave myself a 30% chance to reverse because if EIP-8361 passes in a modified form with a sufficiently long transition period (the proposal mentions 18 months), the impact might be milder than I expect. For those following ETH staking mechanisms, do you think the impact on the DeFi side will be more severe than the consensus layer issuance itself, or not so much? #现货ETF资金分化，BTC卖压仍在